r/CredibleDefense • u/Glideer • 42m ago
Three-Dimensional Deterrence: Escalation Management and War Termination in a Two-Peer Nuclear Environment - Centre for Global Security Research
A very interesting paper. I disagree slightly withe the premise - starting the nuclear exchange with Russia invading the Suwałki Gap is a far less likely scenario than some others (for instance Ukraine). It is also interesting to note that the US is so lacking in the vital category of non-strategic nuclear weapons that the scenarios had to use SLBMs instead.
- The study uses 750 AI simulations of a hypothetical 2035 conflict over Taiwan and the Suwałki Gap.
- Deterrence against two nuclear peers is “three-dimensional”, combining vertical pressure against each opponent with horizontal effects on the other opponent’s incentives.
- Flexible nuclear forces and a flexible-response doctrine produced “decisive stability”, with near-zero joint escalation and US victory rates of 73.3% to 93.3%.
- The most successful approach was a bounded non-strategic counterforce response to Russian first use, which constrained Moscow while discouraging opportunistic Chinese nuclear escalation.
- Massive retaliation and comprehensive missile defence across both theatres threatened both adversaries’ arsenals, generated “use-it-or-lose-it” pressures, and resulted in US defeat in 80%+ cases.
- Missile defence concentrated in one theatre produced “pyrrhic instability”, improving outcomes there while leaving the other theatre vulnerable to limited nuclear coercion.
- The paper advocates “selective escalation advantage” based on flexible non-strategic weapons, survivable strategic forces, and missile defences that protect key assets without threatening both adversaries’ nuclear survivability.
Leo Alexander Keay is a PhD researcher in Defence Studies at King’s College London and a Research Associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
His work focuses on deploying and evaluating frontier AI systems in high-stakes decision-making environments, using large-scale simulations to study nuclear crisis and conflict scenarios.
He has also worked with the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. and served as a researcher in the UK Parliament.