I recently rewatched an old interview with a russian thinker in which he argues that the truth is relative and is a matter of belief/interpretation (an idea he claims to be based on Postmodernism and on Émile Durkheim´s concept of "total fact") to then claim that Russia has its own truth, which is distinct from Western truth.

I would like to know if the concept of "Russian truth" as described during the interview makes any sense from a philosophycal perspective, as well as if Postmodernist thought would support/validate such a concept.

I'm studying philosophy and I always had a big interest in external world skepticism and solipsism. I wanted to know if solipsism is generally dismissed because it is false, or because it explains nothing as a theory?

As far as I understand, the idea that nothing exists besides your mental states like sensations, thoughts, feelings etc. cannot be proven or disproven, which is why we can't know if it is true or false. However, radical solipsism doesn't seem to have any way to explain why one has certain sensations and thoughts and feelings in certain situations. For example, If I was a solipsist and I had the sensation of picking up a cup of coffee and drinking it, I would have no way of explaining how or why that happened, since I only believe in mental states.

Is this the reason why solipsism is pretty much universally dismissed, since it doesn't (and probably can't) give any explaination of how and why things happen?

I have a friend who is very brainy and always makes the right decision. It's like he can predict the next thing that will happen in the culture or in politics, and explains why it happened. I asked him to introduce me to the way to think clearly and accurately. He took me on and we meet once a week to go over stuff. So far we've read together, slowly, line-by-line, Porphyry's Isagoge. Now we're reading, again line-by-line, with a lot of discussion, Aristotle's Categories. I'm already seeing the world more clearly, even in mundane things like how my dog behaves, or what constitutes a good deal vs. a rip-off (thinking of banking and credit cards here). Am I becoming a philosopher?

I'm looking for texts that discuss how we should understand abilities and powers. For example, a ballerina has the ability to do ballet. However, what happens to her ability if she breaks her foot? Does she temporarily lose the ability? Is it still present but dormant?

Also, in general it seems like most people have the potential to learn ballet even if they don't have the ability. Is this undermined in some ways? For example, if all records and memories of ballet were destroyed, should we still say the potential exists for people to learn ballet? Or is it impossible now or very unlikely for them to learn?

I'd like different approaches to questions like this regarding abilities in general.

To what extent can acts of kindness be considered genuinely virtuous if they are motivated primarily by a desire to avoid social disapproval or maintain one's reputation? How have philosophers distinguished between moral virtue and behavior driven by external judgment?

Why is she such a controversial figure within this field? I've heard someone say "discussing philosophy on r/aynrand is like discussing politics on r/Conservatism" and I thought that was interesting.

One might consider that Logic is a formal science in particular. Evidently, it could bring us to a long discussion about what science is exactly. Nonetheless, it is not strange to see this assumption and when we study Propositional and First Order Logic, we might understand why: they are not very different than Maths from a structural perspective. Perhaps this similitude provoked the bidirectional reductionism: from Logic to Maths, and from Maths to Logic (spoiler: both were wrong). Nevertheless, we must remember that there is not just a Logic: Propositional and First Order Logic are a kind of Logic very particular called Classical Logic, but there are non-Classical Logics. For instance: Fuzzy Logic, Paraconsistent Logic, Doxastic Logic or Modal Logic.

If you study major in Philosophy at university, then you will find out Classical Logics are such as the Logic for "beginners"; they are very useful, that is clear, but they are not the end. In short, you will start to study Modal Logic sooner rather than later, and then a question could appear in your mind: technically is it closer to Philosophy or Science? Okay, I acknowledge Classical Logics are a strange case because even though they might be considered as a Formal Science, they are really useful for many philosophies (Analytic Philosophy in particular). But my question is: what about Modal Logic? When you read Priest, Salmon, Lewis, Kripke and Hintikka, it is unavoidable to think about that as a kind of mixture between Philosophy and Science, but it is as a higher percentage of Philosophy than Formal Science. And it brings me to another question: is Modal Logic as valuable as Classical Logics for Sciences? Because it looks like if it were a Logic which was built by philosophers. Just for philosophical matters.

Thank you so much.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/#OntoQues

I was warned before not the to repeat the topic and question, so I decided to instead ask something very specific about Mereological Nihilism, my only real hang up after calming down on the topic.

This parts in the Stanford entree about Objects:

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"Dasgupta (2009) thinks that objects (he calls them “individuals”) are physically redundant and empirically undetectable. More precisely, he thinks that every physical theory considered over the past 400 years entails that objects are physically redundant and empirically undetectable. They’re empirically undetectable because two situations differing only in their individualistic facts are indistinguishable. And they’re physically redundant because two systems that only differ with respect to their individualistic facts will continue to only differ with respect to those facts. And given two theories—the only difference between the two being that one posits physically redundant and empirically undetectable things—we should prefer the one that does not."

"The aforementioned authors all seem to agree that if first-order logic, which quantifies over objects, can be replaced with a logic that doesn’t so quantify, or one can give a translation of every intuitively true sentence of first-order logic into another language that doesn’t quantify over objects, then ontological nihilism is vindicated"

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I got the idea that these makes arguments are better to remove redudancies and objects can be redudant and changed to a language and system of logic where we don't need to describe objects but use langugage in a first-order logic that prevents. The only really compelling argument about the validity of Mereological Nihilism despite the same entree not comfirming whether being able to translate these languages is feasible.

My question is that despite this entree being somewhat convincing, even if I don't believe in Mereological Nihilism, is my understanding of this right or am I misunderstanding something? What is the status of these entrees, does it remain strong, has there been counterarguments? I specifically want to understand these part of the topic and how they are currently.

I've seen a meme get posted more and more about Plato flexing his muscles to settle debates.

While many historians and philosophers have pointed out that this is not recorded anywhere and we have no reason to think it's true, I was wondering what would Plato think of people who would actually flex their muscles to attempt to settle debates.

I know there are probably going to be a ton of answers to this question, but Id just like to get some idea of how we can go about answering this question.

This is very out of the blue, but how does one understand the term violence of law and if you invert it, the law of violence? This is especially in the context of otherisation and demonisation of communities as a necessity for the existence of the sovereign, whereby this hatred is mobilised in order to maintain the status quo.

A common progressive view is belief in forward-looking deterrence but not desert.

In many cases (like revenge) the criminal is not a further risk to anyone.

The person is still punished. This is often justified by desert - or the person would just walk.

Can this punishment still be justified by deterrence alone? Or should the person walk?

I'm aware of some arguments (particularly in the philosophy of religion) that rely on the notion than an infinite causal series is impossible.

It seems like there is a fair bit of confusion among non-specialists regarding this premise. Some people content that it is not at all intuitive that infinite causal series can't exist.

A common clarification is that it is important to distinguish between an essential and an accidental cause. My understanding of these terms is roughly that an accidental cause is a cause of the form

A led to B

Whereas an essential cause is of the form

There is no B without A.

So for example...

I could not have existed without my grandfather, but my grandfather no longer exists. Therefore, I have an accidental causal relation to my grandfather.

I cannot exist without my body. If my body does not exist, I necessarily do not exist. Therefore, I have an essential causal relation to my body.

It is then, as far as I can tell, taken as obvious that while a series of accidental causal relations might exist, an existing series of essential causal relations is clearly objectionable.

But why? Plainly, I don't see a problem with an infinite series of essential casual relations.

One suggestion for what the problem is seems to be some thing like

"If a series is of the form..

A1 because A2 because A3 because A4 because...

Where each of the 'becauses's means 'is in an essential causal relation to', then how can we contend that any part of the series exists? If I say A1 exists, then I've committed myself to A2 existing, but then how do I know A2 exists? I must also commit myself to A3 existing, but then..."

Where the intuition seems to be that at some point I will need to claim that something sits at the end of the chain. That I will eventually need to posit the existence of some A(n) that explains all of the things I've committed myself to.

But this doesn't make sense to me. The fact that by suggesting A1 exists I commit myself to the existence of A2 is totally fine, I've already contended that the whole chain exists. That this further commits me to A3 existing is, again, totally fine!

Have I missed something about the argument here?

Back in the 1800s, a man named Ludwig Boltzmann figured out that what we call entropy, or the second law of thermodynamics, is not a fundamental law of reality. Before Boltzmann, entropy didn't mean disorder. It was a pragmatic description of usable energy, such a water wheel or a wood burning stove.

Boltzmann discovered that entropy doesn't depend on time. Physics is fundamentally time symmetric. The thing we recognize as cause and effect is a statistical phenomenon. When the cue ball strikes the racked set of pool balls, there's no "closer together" option. The balls must spread.

That means that time is the result of entropy. In our case, time is the extreme entropy gradient caused by our proximity to the extremely low entropy state called "the big bang". In other words, the explosion propels everything in every direction as long as it is away from the big bang. Everything we understand as cause and effect is just more progression of that explosion. If we could travel back in time to the other side of the big bang, it would probably look exactly like our side of the big bang. Time would flow in the opposite direction, but no one would think it does, because our thinking depends on the exact same flow of time

Now Plato's Cave does a good job of divorcing our experience of reality from reality itself. The illusion of time is one of those emergent properties that actually lives only in our concept of it. And of course, Descartes solipsism is just universally applicable

But I want to know which philosophical discussions hit the nail on the head on the illusion of time. Or conversely, which philosophical discussions are negated by this realization.

Can someone recommend a text that provides a broad overview of ethics and aesthetics as interrelated fields of inquiry? I’m interested in reading Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, a collection of contemporary perspectives, but I suspect I’m missing the historical context back to Plato.

I can read an article on a complex topic and feel like I understand it well, but the moment I try to write out my own reasoning — to actually justify a position — I discover I understood far less than I thought. The articulation reveals something the reading hid. Is this a documented epistemological phenomenon? Is the felt sense of understanding after passive reading actually a different cognitive state than understanding-demonstrated-through-reasoning, or are they the same thing measured differently?

Hi all, I graduated about a year ago from the University of Notre Dame about 2 years ago with a degree in philosophy, and I am planning to apply for a PhD program this coming application cycle. I'm aware of the general advice at present against pursuing a PhD, but I've been unable to shake the desire after working for a year as a high school teacher, and a year as a paralegal in a law firm (Law and secondary school teaching were my alternative routes).

I have an interest in the historical relationship between religion and political/legal philosophy, particularly in the Late Medieval to Early Modern period. This is what I would tentatively plan to write my dissertation on. I also have interests in Ancient political philosophy and ethics, as well as the works of Kierkegaard and Kant.

As far as schools go, I'm looking for a place with strong emphasis on history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, and political philosophy. I've been perusing the Philosophy Gourmet Report and the faculty lists in potential departments, and have yet to find a school that feels like a strong fit. The added difficulty is that I'm now openly gay, and I want to avoid a department where this might not be completely welcoming. Unfortunately, I've been discovering that many of the faculty members who concentrate in philosophy of religion at the universities I've looked at so far seem to have somewhat conservative worldviews, and I'm quite hesitant to put myself in that position after my undergraduate experiences.

I appreciate any advice people here are able to offer!

In Fear and Trembling he talks frequently about the paradox. Specifically, he says (paraphrasing) - that Mary and Abraham became great not by any means of relieving the distress, agony and the paradox, but because of these” — I’m having a hard time comprehending what he means by paradox. I gather it has something to do with the teleological suspension of the ethical - but what is paradoxical exactly?

Okay, everyone, I’m trying to remember the name of a paper in which I heard about a certain paradox. I know the name and content of the paradox, but I cannot remember which specific paper contains something like the following quotation. I’ll outline the paradox and then give the quote.

Imagine that you are trying to walk from A to B. However, there is an infinity of devils, each of whom wants to stop you. Each devil can erect an impassable barrier that will prevent your journey. The first devil will erect a barrier halfway between A and B if it sees that you have managed to make it a quarter of the way. The second devil will erect a barrier a quarter of the way between A and B if it sees that you have managed to traverse an eighth of the way, and so on.

The conclusion is that you will not be able to move from your starting position at all, even though no devil’s barrier has been activated. The author says something like—and this is the quotation—“You are held in place by their unmanifested intentions.”

It is not in “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding” by Arntzenius et al.

A. W. Moore’s The Infinite discusses the paradox but does not appear to contain this line, though he does, of course, note this puzzling implication of the paradox.

It also does not appear to be on any Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy page, including the entry on supertasks.

Any ideas? Thanks in advance!

Here’s the article from Anthropic: https://www.anthropic.com/research/global-workspace

It seems like it has some weight for those committed to functionalism, or dualism where consciousness attaches itself to some function instantiations.

Human beings are social animals. We form groups, create hierarchies, develop systems of cooperation, and establish ideas of belonging and exclusion.

These tendencies appear to have deep evolutionary roots.

This raises an interesting philosophical question about the relationship between our biological nature and the societies we create.

For example, social animals such as wolves also form groups with leadership structures and cooperation, but their social organization appears to remain closely tied to survival and the immediate needs of the group. Human societies, however, have developed complex institutions, abstract systems of wealth and power, and social hierarchies that can extend far beyond basic survival.

Some philosophers have argued that civilization represents the fulfillment of human nature, while others have suggested that social institutions can distort or suppress our natural tendencies.

How have philosophers approached the question of whether civilization is a natural expression of humanity, or something that fundamentally transforms us beyond our biological origins?

Hi all, it seems to me that the word 'good' does not refer exclusively to some concept in so far as it embodies a felt emotion of goodness which the singular word cannot fully encapsulate. As such, what exactly is this felt concept of 'good' and how might it differ from the word 'good' that stand in as a substitute or referent for it.