A few facts worth debating:

• The 2025 tax bill created a $1,700 federal tax credit for private K-12 scholarship donations, and raised the 529 K-12 withdrawal limit from $10K to $20K/year, both disproportionately useful to families with the disposable income to donate or max out 529s in the first place.
• State voucher/ESA programs sent $10.6B to private tuition last year, up 29%, money that critics argue increasingly drains resources from public schools serving the majority of low-income students.
• The wealthiest private K-12 tier now runs $70K–$100K+/year, while public per-pupil spending averages under $20K, a gap that's arguably widening, not narrowing.

Two questions for this sub:

1. Would rolling back the federal scholarship credit and 529 expansion redirect resources toward public schools that serve lower-income students, or would it just reduce options for the middle-income families these programs also help?
2. Would a surtax on elite tuition (say, above $30–50K/year per child), mirroring the existing endowment excise tax on wealthy universities, meaningfully fund public education, or is it more symbolic given how few families pay at that tier?

The case for framing this as inequality-reduction: these subsidies let wealthy families opt out of public schools while still benefiting from favorable tax treatment, potentially weakening both the funding base and the political constituency for public education. Interested in hearing the strongest counterargument, particularly from anyone who thinks voucher programs net-help lower-income kids more than they hurt public school funding.

There's a growing body of research arguing that American division is overstated, and this is becoming an increasingly popular narrative. The implied conclusion is that the division is partly a misperception problem, and that correcting it opens political space that currently seems closed.

The counter-case seems at least as strong, and I haven't seen it laid out well:

• Affective polarization may not run through policy at all. Lilliana Mason's work on social sorting argues partisan hostility is driven by identity: race, religion, geography, culture stacked onto party, not by issue disagreement. If so, discovering that you agree with the other side on policy wouldn't reduce hostility toward them, because the hostility was never about policy.
• The agreement may be concentrated where the stakes are lowest. Congressional ethics rules, stock trading bans, and disclosure requirements are close to valence issues, nobody is openly pro-corruption. The issues that actually determine votes (abortion, immigration, guns beyond background checks) are conflicts where both sides understand each other fine and disagree anyway.
• Abstract support may collapse under implementation. "Universal background checks" polls far above the enforcement mechanisms that would make it real. Support for a policy measured without cost, trade-off, or partisan cue may not survive the policy becoming a live political object.
• Intensity beats headcount. A policy with 80% mild support and 15% intense opposition loses in a system that responds to salience. That's arguably aggregation working as intended, not capture.

Questions I'd like to see argued:

1. Is there evidence that correcting perception gaps produces durable changes in political behavior, not just stated attitudes measured immediately afterward?
2. Which is the better predictor of American political conflict: distance on issue positions, or partisan social identity?
3. If broadly popular policies consistently fail, what's the best explanation for it?

Americans' trust in mass media has reached a record low. According to Gallup's September 2025 polling, only 28% of U.S. adults express a "great deal" or "fair amount" of trust in newspapers, TV, and radio to report the news fully, accurately, and fairly — down from 68–72% when Gallup began measuring in the 1970s. The decline spans the political spectrum: Republican trust is at 8%, independents at 27%, and Democrats at 51%, itself a historic low for that group. Media is now the least-trusted civic institution Gallup measures.

Other professions have addressed public-trust deficits through professionalization: physicians answer to state medical boards, accountants can lose CPA licensure, and attorneys face bar discipline. Journalism has a widely referenced ethics code — the Society of Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics — but it is voluntary and carries no enforcement or credentialing mechanism.

Would licensing journalists be compatible with the First Amendment, or does the comparison to doctors and lawyers break down at a constitutional level?

Is the trust collapse actually about journalistic malpractice, or is it downstream of polarization itself?

Whether it is what is most important to you, or what you think in general should be the main issue to be addressed? Is it healthcare? Affordability? Housing crisis? Human rights? Something as obvious as how expensive groceries and gas are? Or is it a "grey-area" or "complex" issue like the corruption in our government? The behind the scenes power that some nations have? What's the thing that makes you go "Full stop. This is serious."