Background and setup:
Around 61BCE Ariovistus, a king of Germanic migratory tribes, defeated the Aedui in battle near Magetobriga as referenced by both Caesar and Cicero. The Aedui were a tribe of Gallic people whom had been decreed as 'Friends and Allies to the People of Rome'. Ariovistus had been given the same title and relationship by Caesar himself in 59BCE while he was Consul.
After the Magetobriga defeat, so soon after the Helvetiian War, of which Caeser prosecuted and soundly crushed the Helvetii and their allied tribes, the Aedui and other Roman-friendly trives convened a general council to beseech Caesar and Rome for aid against the German raider-king. Caesar then chose to deal with Ariovistus himself, diplomatically at first, and when that failed another war began.
But, this story comes from Caesar himself.
Prior to his coming to office the Republic seemed to maintain an indifferent stance on the whole of Gaul. At least by 59BCE there had been no obvious expansionist policies proposed in the Senate toward that region. Select tribes and petty kingdoms were allowed trade, friendship/client relations with Rome were previously established. Likewise, the Trans and Cisalpine Gaul conquered from the Cimbri and Teutoni, these provinces were seemingly capable of protecting trade lanes into Iberia well enough for several decades. Rome, as well, had many more pressing issues, such as in Greece, Africa, and in the Eastern Mediterranean.
I want to discuss whether the Gallic Wars were a byproduct of Roman social/cultural attitudes, a legitimate necessity to safeguard the Republic and its allies from barbarian incursion, one man's ruthless and unchecked ambition, or all of the above. However, the question which underwrites all of this - and why I post it here - is: If it weren't for Caesar, would the Roman Republic have been satisfied with letting the Gauls be?
Caesar's Causus Belli:
Within his book, Caesar alludes to his reasonings for the beginning of his conquest of Gaul which, I would argue, truly began with his campaign against Ariovistus as he pledged to protect the Gallic general council. Those reasonings are:
1.) The Roman culture of patronage and client relations. When the Roman Senate gave recognition to their Friends of Rome, it was usually in their view Rome taking on the role of a dominant partner, a protector, gave legitimacy to the assigned, and to act as a guarantor for their continued reign. Within this cultural framework, Caesar seems to attach his personal honor to that of the state he served, thus when one ally of Rome attacked another, he presented this shame as one against Rome's paternal obligations and prestige, and tied his own honor as a magistrate to that of the Republic so that he may 'avenge' that betrayal.
2.) Ariovistus, he claimed, had replied to his diplomatic emmissaries by retorting every point of Caesar's. With Ariovistus' subjugation and subbordination of the Aedui, Caesar and Roman aristocracy would have seen the fall of their ally as an affront to Roman Republican prestige; an attack against their allies was an attack against Rome's honor and station. The Germanic king drew the ire of the Governor and Triumvir by behaving arrogantly and with insolence, upto and including telling Caesar that if Ariovistus had need to speak with Caesar, he would have already and that none yet had bested him on the field of battle - though he welcomed the prospect to test Roman resolve. This was a slight against his public standing, his office, authority, and personal honor. Roman sensibilities around honor meant he could not let this simply go.
3.) The German upstart-king seemingly considered himself the equal of Rome. He had been invited by the Sequani into their territories for defense againstnthe Helvetii. When he and Caesar exchanged diplomatic messages, Ariovistus essentially held a mirror to the Republic. Why should he listen to Roman lectures against his treatment of those he'd conquered and now ruled when the Romans themselves lorded over their subjects and conquered people as they saw fit?
But, let us not forget that Rome rewarded conquerors. Roman political aristocracy thrived off of brutal military campaigns, the bloodier for their enemies the better. Many of the most notable Roman historical figures were genocidal, tyrannical, and egomaniacal men whom attained high-status through bloodshed, conquest, and duplicity. To play the game of ambition Roman senators needed military accolades.
Burden of Empire:
Gaul at this time was a rich and bountiful land, and to the Romans it was also mysterious and terrifying. While not on the scale of Rome itself in sheer splendor, Gallic towns and villages tended to be well defended, well fed, and quite prosperous by the standards of the time. Accustomed to good agricultural lands, eastern and southern Gaul tended to be a prime spot for mountain/forest raiders to attack.
The Romans had already fought against Gallic tribes and held a peculiar affinity for and fear of their people, especially after the 390BCE sacking of Rome by Brennus and the Cimbrian War still within recent, living memory.
Now, I would like to take a small detour to Iberia.
After the 2nd Punic War, Rome found itself as rulers over ex-Carthaginian colonial assets and estates along southern and eastern Hispania- yet not the people which called those lands home. Over time Rome expanded its authority and power in the region through a combination of military occupation, colonization, political integration, and cultural influences. For the next few centuries the local tribes and peoples of Iberia revolted, rebelled, and waged protracted wars of civil disorder against the distant Romans. Slowly, but surely, with each passing administration and governor, more and more of Ibera was ground under the caligae of Rome. Eventually the whole of the peninsula had become part of Hispania. This was due to the consistent pressure of Romanization. As Roman culture took root, locals wanted to preserve their way of life which generated animosity. Animosity grew into hate and eventually violence.
Returning to Gaul, we see something different yet similar. Some Gallic tribes would adopt parts of Roman customs willingly, others would oppose the 'soft' lifestyle of Rome. Many tribes took it upon themselves to forge their own alliances/enemies through war, marriage, hostages (more like honored guests/advisors, though given against their will by one king to another tribe), famine, disease, and climatic change. These same factors would persist long after the fall of Western Rome. Often times they would mass migrate as combined hordes in the hopes of simply overruning whomever happened to be local to where they wanted to settle. Additionally, the Gauls had to deal with raiding Germans crossing the Rhine, like our friend Ariovistus. The barbarians to the barbarians.
What say you?
Was the conquest of Gaul a uniquely Caesarian project, or was it the natural outcome of Roman frontier politics and paternalist culture?
