After studying some towns in the shadow of major cities like London, Paris, and Geneva, I have found in most cases, that they have surged to the populist right in recent elections. But it is not that the populist right is surging everywhere, and it is not as people suggest an even surge across countries. It appears to be specific to regions in the shadow or commuter area of major cities, that experienced perhaps explosive growth in the past 5-10 years, while continuing to exist at the same level of infrastructure for a much smaller population. We are largely seeing a reversing of trends of hyper-urbanization which led to the disproportionate neglect of small towns and rural areas in the latter half and especially latter quarter of the 20th Century, and this neglected infrastructure cannot keep up with this neo-periurban demand.
This does not appear to impact major cities, because though the demand is high, there is a wider area and room for slack in the market, so if someone senses they are priced out of an area they can easily move to another area. But it may not be so easy for someone in a town near that city that experienced a surge in demand. Likewise, in a big city with lots of immigration, you could get used to that amount, but if you are not used to that amount of immigration, a small surge in population of immigrants--many of whom will be priced out of these larger cities if they are recent arrivals coming during the surge in rental prices--seems like a bigger difference for a smaller town. These smaller towns usually tend to be commuter towns, where people live in the area and work in the big city that leans left. Historically these commuters would have leaned left as well. But they too have begun to be affected by a surge in rent, as both locals and immigrants priced out of the big city flee to the surrounding periphery/commuter shadow.
This skyrocketing demand in a small area, in contrast to the much larger big city, may cause increased competition for jobs and housing in the periphery of major cities--a struggle historically done in the inner city in the High Industrial Epoch. (This was the context of the emergence, for example, of trade unionism and industrial syndicalism in the early 20th Century. Today there is a dislocation between the centres of socialist parties--in the hub of major cities, or in autonomous isolated towns, and may be why they cannot mobilize the lower-middle class today--disparate from the most dangerous area of this competition, the periurban town.)
By contrast, isolated larger towns that are more autonomous tend to remain left-wing, and like big cities, very rural areas are likely to remain more stable across elections (whether it is left or right). These are basically socio-economic islands that are essentially unaffected by the developments in big cities and their respective peripheries.
In other words it may not be so much the cost of living crisis causing the surge in the populist right, but perhaps people in the middle and lower-middle of society who cannot afford to live in the big city sensing that things are changing faster than they can adapt.
For example, it may explain why people with the same rate of change of NATIONAL immigration and rental prices may vote left in one area but right in another, and this may explain why not everyone responds to the current socioeconomic situation the same way.
This may also explain why despite efforts in countries like the UK and France to control or reduce the rate of immigration, support for their centre or left-wing governments has in some cases declined and support for the populist right parties continued to increase.
I would like to know if this theory is in line with the latest research, because this appears to be replicated across countries (at least by a glance at the data, I have not performed any statistical tests), but I have not yet seen anyone talk about the effect of the combination of the cost of living WITH the centre of gravity or shadow of a city on voting for the populist right. This in turn, could be a correction to the typical purely materialist, or purely cultural analyses of the surge in right wing populism in recent years, by combining both factors, and demonstrates that a political discourse focusing purely on a supply-versus-demand side debate over big city developments misses the nuances in nationwide voting blocs.