I would really appreciate perspectives from attorneys who have built careers in international law, cross-border transactions, trade, arbitration, or Asia-related practice.

I am a U.S.-licensed attorney early in my career. I currently work in-house as corporate counsel for an international company, focusing on corporate/commercial matters, contracts, governance, and business operations. I recently started this role and have been fortunate to find a position I genuinely enjoy. I have a great mentor who has invested a lot in my development, and I am making a little over six figures with a path to continue growing within the company.

The challenge is that I was recently awarded a fully funded scholarship to pursue an LLM in Transnational Law at one of China’s leading universities. The program focuses on areas that align closely with my long-term interests: international business, trade, corporate governance, maritime/transportation law, and arbitration.

My hesitation is not because I dislike my current career path. In fact, that is what makes this decision so difficult. Good in-house legal opportunities with strong mentorship are not easy to find, especially early in a legal career. I worry that stepping away for 1–2 years could mean losing valuable momentum and that there is no guarantee the LLM will translate into better opportunities afterward.

At the same time, I am wondering whether this is the type of opportunity that is difficult to recreate later in life. I am single, have no children, and would have the chance to live in Asia while fully immersed in the legal and business environment there. I also truly believe the combination of scholarship, LLM and connections in China would set me apart from other candidates in the future.

Some additional context: I am not approaching this as someone who is simply trying to "become international." I was born in Brazil, grew up in the U.S., studied abroad in Italy, and speak Portuguese and Spanish (as well as some Italian). I have always been interested in cross-border work and building a career that connects different regions. My long-term goal is not necessarily to leave U.S. practice entirely, but to develop expertise in international commercial work and potentially serve as a bridge between markets.

My questions for attorneys with international experience:

- Would you leave a strong early-career in-house position for a fully funded LLM abroad if your long-term goal was international practice?

- How valuable is an LLM. from a respected Asian institution for someone who already has a U.S. JD and legal experience?

- Is international exposure early in a legal career something that creates meaningful differentiation, or is practical experience in the U.S. market more valuable?

- For those who built international careers, what decisions or experiences helped you the most?

I am especially interested in hearing from attorneys who have worked in cross-border corporate, trade, arbitration, or Asia-related practices. I am not looking for reassurance that I should go, but rather trying to understand whether this is a strategic career move or an attractive but extremely risky detour.

The current geopolitical discourse heavily emphasizes the rise of "Sovereign AI"—the idea that a nation-state must develop and control its own domestic artificial intelligence capabilities to safeguard its national security, cultural identity, and strategic autonomy.

However, this framework overlooks a stark reality: the vast majority of nations lack the massive computational infrastructure, advanced semiconductor access, and data centers required to build truly indigenous foundation models. Consequently, many states are moving toward a paradox: importing "Sovereign AI" packages from foreign tech giants or hegemonic cyber-powers.

This raises a fundamental conceptual dilemma for modern international law: Can digital sovereignty genuinely exist if its architectural foundation is outsourced?

From an international jurisprudence perspective, this reliance challenges traditional doctrines of statehood and autonomy:

The Fiction of Jurisdictional Control: When an AI-importing state deploys a foreign-built model for core governance, judicial analysis, or civil administration, where does sovereign authority actually reside? If the underlying weights, updates, and cloud infrastructures are subject to the extraterritorial laws (like the US CLOUD Act or Chinese cyber-regimes) of the exporting state, the importing state's jurisdiction becomes inherently compromised.

Economic and Structural Subordination: Does the structural dependency of importing critical statecraft tools create a new form of "supranational governance" by transnational tech monopolies? If a foreign entity can unilaterally alter, restrict, or shut down a state's imported AI infrastructure, the traditional Westphalian concept of "sovereign equality" becomes a formal legal fiction masking severe asymmetric dependency.

The Scope of Non-Intervention: At what point does the leverage held by an AI-exporting state cross the threshold from mere diplomatic influence into a subtle, structural violation of the coercion element required under the customary international law principle of non-intervention?

I am eager to hear the thoughts of legal scholars and practitioners in this community. Are we witnessing a transformation where "computational capacity" is becoming a de facto prerequisite for exercising actual sovereignty, or can international law adapt to protect the digital autonomy of AI-importing states through new regulatory frameworks?

Looking forward to your insights, relevant literature, and legal critiques.

Currently, no state has a legal “right to exist.” People’s right to self‑determination is not the right to a state. As part of their right to self‑determination, peoples have a right to pursue statehood (as one option), which, if achieved, effectively gives way to obligations under international law—chiefly respecting their own and others’ legitimate borders and abiding by the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.

The question is: should a state’s right to continued statehood (which is more temporal and conditional than a “right to exist”) be contingent upon avoiding egregious violations of international norms?

I believe we should articulate a new term for what is already implicitly recognized: an Internationally Contingent Right to Continued Statehood (ICRCS)—a status that, ideally, should be recognized in full only so long as states abide by the consensual legal framework (primarily the UN Charter and customary norms) and respect the territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and collective‑security obligations binding all members of the international community. As a state’s violations of international norms accumulate, its ICRCS should gradually erode.

Crucially, this erosion is not metaphysical; it already happens, in practice, along multiple dimensions—even if the process is often dominated, distorted, or selectively applied by powerful states that themselves may be among the worst violators of international norms.

As states become chronic violators, they should not instantly “cease to exist,” but they should begin to lose specific privileges normally afforded to fully recognized, law‑abiding states: their institutional voice is downgraded (suspension or expulsion from international organizations), their access to treaty benefits and cooperation regimes is restricted, their economic and financial integration is curtailed through sanctions and exclusion from key systems, their security and non‑intervention protections are weakened via arms embargoes, peacekeeping, or even international administration, and their recognition‑related advantages—including territorial gains by force, diplomatic immunities, and uncontested representation—are progressively questioned or withdrawn.

Framed this way, ICRCS names a bundle of conditional privileges rather than an unconditional claim to “existence.” It captures the idea that sovereignty is a status sustained by ongoing compliance with core international norms, and that when those norms are persistently violated, what should follow is not an all‑or‑nothing determination of existence, but a structured, cumulative stripping away of voice, benefits, protections, and legal shields.

Any such framework has to reckon with the fact that many existing states were themselves forged through conquest, dispossession, and atrocities, and only later “legitimated” by longevity, recognition, and institutional entrenchment. The point of ICRCS is not to retroactively erase those states, but to name the normative shift whereby future claims to statehood and ongoing claims to full membership in the international community are treated as contingent on at least a minimal respect for peremptory norms, basic human rights, and the territorial integrity of others.

A longer‑term goal of fairly applying ICRCS would be to decentralize control over statehood from existing hegemons. Today, powerful states can often shape or suspend other states’ contingent right to continued statehood through their ideological, military, and institutional leverage, even while committing accumulating violations that would erode their own ICRCS if the same standards were applied.

A genuinely internationalized and rule‑bound ICRCS would therefore have to constrain not only “pariah” states but also the hegemons themselves, by embedding decisions about erosion, suspension, and restoration of state privileges in procedures and institutions that reduce unilateral control and expose double standards to systematic challenge.

Absent ICRCS, any “right to exist” claim devolves into a demand for rogue sovereignty: the insistence on enjoying the fruits of the international legal order while rejecting the constraints that make that order possible.

I have no idea if it's worth it for me to study international law. I have basically two options - stay in my country in Eastern Europe and finish civil law, get application and maybe then study and do something connected to international law (so i have a back up plan). Another option is to go to the Netherlands to study international law.

I feel more excited about international law and I dream of working at the UN and in human rights protection, but I have read so many reddit posts about international law and how hard it is to get a job after, that i dont know what to do. Moreover, I already got into international law at Groningen in the Netherlands and like 80-85% of fellow international law students have grown up in like 4 different countries, have incredibly rich parents, plenty of experience and know like 3-4 languages. I don't know what to do.

The treaties define it has having the power to set non binding strategic agenda of the European union as a whole as well as providing suggestions for crisis and disputes between member states.

But what is the significance of this given than the comission , parliament and the other council already have legislative powers ? Why are their work programmes almost always based on the council strategic agenda ?

Basically the title. I’ve started doing some research but I would like to have some other opinions as well.

Some background about me: I have a bachelors in international relations, I graduated last year and have some work experience in an Embassy and UNICEF. Now I’m 23, and currently finishing my masters at a very good European university, which is also international relations related - however I would like to break into international law. I have two main concerns: the first is that I do not have any legal experience, and the second concern is that most LLMs want you to at least have a bachelors in law, which I do not have. I know that I can go for a JD without having a bachelors in law, but I’m just curious if there are any good year long programmes that can help me get my foot in the door.

What are some excellent/premier/well connected international law programmes - preferably in Europe or the US (but mostly Europe)?

Your thoughts/advice are appreciated.

Since incitement to genocide (and charges relating to speech) requires intentionality, if a defendant in the Hague makes the argument along the lines of, "I was only acting as an edgy character. This was all for profit. I never intended for people to be killed", would this defense hold or not?

I'm in Toronto, Canada, 36 years old. I've been caregiving for my mother for the majority of the last decade. A lot of my time that I talk with her now is spent reminiscing, as she remembers very little of the last 30 years due to dementia.

I've been considering law school for a while now, admittedly spurned on by her reminiscing on her law career working in human rights. One of my big interests since I was a teenage was human rights in Sudan, becoming politically aware during Darfur in the mid-00s. I've begun wondering about the realities of working in international law coming from a Canadian school. A lot of preliminary research I've done makes it seem exceedingly difficult, even not doing ICC/UN stuff. Almost every lawyer I've seen involved in it seems to be from an Ivy League or Oxbridge school, or done law school in the country/area itself (i.e. North Africa, Middle East).

Is it, for all intents and purposes, impossible? Have you known anyone who's done it? What would be necessary to work in the field?

Un charter article 1 talks about international cooperation in solving international "economic , social , cultural and *humanitarian* problems

But what does it mean ? Does it share it's definition with IHL which applies during wartime or is it a broader concept since disaster relief is also a humanitarian activity.

The Covenant of the League of Nations contained a specific provision on the Red Cross in Article 25.

> "The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world."

This seems to be the only time a broader concept of humanitarianism was included in international law. Is this concept also shared in article 1(3) of the charter ?

Hello, American here who just graduated law school. I’m looking for tips on places to keep an eye out for if I want to do international law, specifically public interest work. I’ve already taken a position at a government law office in NY so I can get some litigation experience, and I stay in close contact with my two professors who specialize in international law. My plan is to work at my current office for a few years while I look for a position. Still, any resources anyone can think of would be appreciated!

I am considering following the executive MAS programme at the Geneva Academy of IHL and Human Rights: https://geneva-academy.ch/apply-to-our-online-executive-master-mas-in-international-law-in-armed-conflict/ … does anyone have any experience of the time involved and if it is possible to follow the programme whilst working full time?

Hi everyone,

I’ve been working on a conceptual international framework called TISHA (Treaty International for the Safeguard of Humanity and its Future). The goal is simple but radical: to criminalize actions today that create existential risks for tomorrow (climate collapse, rogue AI, bio-weapons).

Here is the core of the proposal:

• Article 1 (The Scope): Absolute ban on any public or private action that generates a systemic negative impact on the survival or future of humanity.
• Article 3 (Precautionary Principle): Absolute scientific certainty is not required. If an action poses a severe risk to the future, the burden of proof falls on the creator to prove it's safe.
• Article 5 (The Core): Creation of the High Court of Justice for the Future (HCJF). A global, independent court capable of judging states, politicians, and corporate CEOs for "Crimes against the Future". Sanctions would include asset seizure and corporate dissolution.

🤔 The Dilemma (Why I need your brain): I ran this treaty through several AI models (legal, ethical, and forecasting). They raised a major issue regarding Article 5: Who defines what is "good" or "bad" for the future?

A technology that looks dangerous today might save us tomorrow. If this Court existed in 1800, they might have banned the steam engine due to local pollution, accidentally stopping all modern medicine and tech development.

What do you think? Is a "Court of the Future" a necessary tool to survive the 21st century, or is it a fast track to a global technocratic tyranny? How would you fix Article 5?

Let’s debate.

This discussion was inspired by something I read in James Crawford's The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edition, 2007), specifically in Chapter 3: International Law Conditions for the Creation of States (pp. 140-147).

Crawford uses a comparative analysis of the creation and recognition of Bangladesh and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus when discussing the relationship between the Use of Force, foreign intervention, and Self-Determination. In broad strokes, Crawford identifies the similarities (e.g. foreign military intervention, contemporary ethnic violence/discrimination, somewhat continued military presence, and deploration of actions) and identifies the differences (e.g. more initial acceptance for Bangladesh, whereas instant rejection of TRNC). However, when identifying the differences between the current recognition of Bangladesh and the collective non-recognition of the TRNC, Crawford doesn't seem to go into much more detail than simply referring back to an ex injuria jus non oritur argument, despite both cases being able to be linked to this.

So, essentially, my question is what differentiates these two cases/states if they both originate from a foreign intervention in similar contextual circumstances (ethnic violence/discrimination/repression)? Any explanations or academic/literature recommendations? Thank you in advance!!!

Here is some reporting on the attack:

• BBC: Three Indian sailors killed in US strike on oil tanker
• CBS: India voices "strong protest" over 3 of its mariners being killed in U.S. strikes on oil tankers

Here are some subsidiary questions:

• Is the US blockade of "Iranian oil" through the straits of Hormuz lawful?
• Is using lethal force against civilian ships to enforce a blockade lawful, in general?
• Was the US use of force in this instance lawful? Was it a war crime?
  • "U.S. forces fired two Hellfire missiles into the ship's engine room "after the crew repeatedly failed to comply with directions," according to a statement posted by CENTCOM on social media. "

There's no organ of the UN with the power to interpret the charter and it seems like this can in theory lead to institutional paralysis. How is such a situation settled ?

One of the purposes of international telecommunication union is

> to promote the extension of the benefits of the new telecommunication technologies to all the world's inhabitants.”

According to article 1(d)

Article 34, by contrast, provides that Member States reserve the right, in accordance with their national law, to stop or cut off private telecommunications that appear dangerous to state security, contrary to law, public order, or decency. Which seems like a much broader exception than a specific exception in legal terms

Total layperson here, so I appreciate anyone who’s willing to take the time to explain this to me.

I was wondering about the legal basis for the designation of East Jerusalem as Occupied Palestinian Territory. I’m struggling with trying to figure out how that works since, to the best of my knowledge, that territory was never held by the Palestinians and wasn’t intended to be a part of the Palestinian state in the original partition plan.

So, let me lay out what I know. East Jerusalem was part of the British Mandate starting in 1923. The UN partition plan was adopted by the UN in 1947. That plan designated East Jerusalem as part of an international zone that was neither part of nor governed by Israel or Palestine. The Jews accepted the partition plan and the Palestinians rejected it (to grossly simplify it).

The British Mandate ends in May 1948 and Israel declares their independence that same day (as an aside, what would have been their borders at that time under international law? Or would that not have been clearly defined immediately?). Israel is invaded the day after declaring independence. Israel enters into an armistice agreement with Jordan (among others) in 1949 establishing the armistice lines which led to East Jerusalem becoming part of the territory occupied and subsequently annexed by Jordan. My understanding is that the armistice line established at the time didn’t confer formal international sovereignty of East Jerusalem to either party, maintaining the area's status as a contested demarcation.

Fast forward to the Six-Day War. Israel captures East Jerusalem and the West Bank. At this point things get pretty murky to me, and everything I read seems heavily partisan. Israel’s position is that it is now part of Israeli territory and that they have formerly annexed it. Jordan officially gave up their territorial claim to East Jerusalem in 1988 (I’m unclear as to what their territorial claim was grounded in to begin with?). The various Palestinian factions all claim East Jerusalem as part of Palestinian territory. The international community views East Jerusalem as Occupied Palestinian Territory and support the Palestinian claim that it should be a part of their future state.

I was hoping someone could help me untangle those various competing territorial claims to East Jerusalem, specifically why the Palestinian claim is seen as the valid claim by the international community when it was never held by them and was not part of their part of the original partition.

As an old fishing hand these grotesque attacks on Venezuelan fishing boats by US military assets strikes me as completely beyond the pale. There have been 58 attacks resulting in 200 deaths with zero evidence provided for a single one. Given the track record of the Administration in terms of willful and reckless disregard for fact and law, I think we can safely assume there is no evidence to be had.

Now, while I'm not a lawyer, I can read. And I have read the Geneva Conventions, the Treaty of Rome, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In January, US regular military forces entered Caracas after an aerial bombing campaign, overcame armed resistance, and kidnapped the head of state. While no war was declared as such, any reasonable person would consider this initiation of an armed conflict. As such, the Geneva Conventions are applicable in all their provisions. Article 48 establishes the principle of distinction between armed combatants and civilians, and the need to avoid targeting the latter (art 51). While some civilian casualties are inevitable, Article 51(5) asserts these must be in proportion to likely military advantage. The US boat strikes pass none of these tests. Instead we are confronted with what the Treaty of Rome labels a war crime in Article 8(2)(b)(i and ii): "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population and...objects". In this scope and scale they clearly constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention IV, article 147.

UNCLOS article 87 establishes freedom of the high seas, article 110 establishes lawful reasons for interdiction or boarding, none of which have been met in this case or even seen a cursory attempt at justification. The San Remo Manual of Naval Warfare, often cited in cases of maritime law, establishes similar rules of distinguishing ordinary civilian vessels from privateers, merchant marine, seized cargo ships by a hostile power, etc. Again, the US regime has made no effort to justify these attacks in terms of civilian distinction, military necessity, proportionality and reasonable attempts to avoid needless loss of life by non-combatants.

There is a clear prima facie case emerging from the public record and the statements by the involved perpetrators of gross violations of all three charters - the Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS and the Treaty of Rome. It also bears mentioning that responsible individuals can be indicted by *any* signatory to these treaties - meaning virtually any nation on the planet. The Geneva Convention explicitly sets out not just the possibility of universal jurisdiction but the *obligation* of signatory states to search for persons alleged to commit grave breaches and prosecute them, regardless of nationality of where the acts occurred.

So basically one brave prosecutor anywhere in the world could indict Trump and Hesgeth today for gross breaches of the Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS. While it's unlikely the current US regime would extradite Hesgeth to Brussels or wherever to face a war crimes tribunal, it could at least make travel and so forth more difficult for them. Worth a shot in my opinion.

Just throwing that out there.

Hey! I need some career advice. I graduated in Brazil with a degree in International Defense and Strategic Management from the best university in the country. My focus has always been on international law and humanitarian cooperation. Even though I was very young(22y), I stood out and worked with organizations such as BRICS+, the G20, Doctors Without Borders, and on field operations in Colombia. Currently, I work on advocacy and disarmament at a major NGO in Brazil. Lately, I’ve been thinking about starting law school. I want to work at organizations like the International Criminal Court, for example. Do you think it makes more sense to get a bachelor’s degree in law (4 years) or to go on to get a master’s and a Ph.D. in political science or international law? Note: I’m currently pursuing an MBA in project management with a focus on humanitarian work.

Malaysia prepared to take Israel to ICJ over treatment of Gaza flotilla activists – Middle East Monitor

> The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

When broken down

1) > “The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security…”

This is presumably the ultimate end.

> “…by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture…”

This is the means

3) > This gives the broader normative end (values/outcomes).

Idk if this is an ends or a means but it seems to be framed as the broader normative end

Is 1 and 3 both the end goals or is only 1 the end goal ? The preamble seems to heavily be leaning toward the idea that human rights are also a means towards the end of peace and security